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THE PRIVILEGING OF VISIO OVER VOX 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EXPERIENCES 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HILDEGARD OF BINGEN AND JOAN OF ARC  Anita Obermeier and Rebecca Kennison   Even  though  medieval  women  mystics  have  enjoyed  increased  attention  in  recent scholarly discussion,  a  topic  that  still has not been  tackled  is  the possible difference between  seeing  a  vision  and  hearing  a  voice  during  a  mystical  experience  and  the ramifications of  this difference  in  the context of medieval  text production and  in  the status  of  mystics  as  authors.  When  a  mystic  relates  a  mystical  experience,  she inevitably creates a text and becomes an author (Petroff 1986, 20–21). In the Christian Middle  Ages,  medieval  text  creation  hinged  on  authority  and  authorization,  as  an imitation of the creative power of God, the Master Author and the Logos (Word) itself, and thus has religious consequences for an aspiring author (Minnis 1988, 73). Bernard McGinn  points  to  this  logocentrality  of medieval writing:  “Jesus  the  preacher  of  the message became Jesus the preached message and soon Jesus the written message, as elements  of  his  preaching  and  the  stories  about  him,  especially  the  account  of  his sacrificial death and rising, were fixed in written form” (1991, 63).1  Mystics, however, not only imitate the creative power of God, but also claim to deliver His  messages.  Their  stake  in  authorship  is  thus  doubled,  and  for  female  medieval mystics, text production proved to be an especially ambivalent endeavor. On the one hand, as Elizabeth Alvilda Petroff notes, the “women writers of mystical literature .  .  . lacked the authority, and the authoritative language, to communicate spiritual truths” (1994, 4). Because of rampant medieval misogyny,  female claims to authorship were especially suspect, as women were often associated with evil. This association carried over from antiquity and found fertile ground in the minds of the church fathers who villainized Eve’s role in the fall (Beer 1991, 2–3; Newman 1985, 170). Thus, backed by the Pauline  rule  on women’s  ecclesiastical  silence,  Jean Gerson’s  pronouncement  on Bridget  of  Sweden  at  the  Council  of  Constance  echoes  the  accepted medieval  norm: “‘All words and works of women must be held suspect’” (quoted in Lagorio 1984, 72). On the other hand, Petroff claims, “[v]isions led women to the acquisition of power in the world while  affirming  their  knowledge  of  themselves  as women. Visions were  a socially  sanctioned  activity  that  freed  a  woman  from  conventional  female  roles  by identifying  her  as  a  religious  figure  .  .  .  [and]  an  artist  “  (1994,  6).  But  as  the experiences  of  the  twelfth‐century  visionary  Hildegard  of  Bingen  and  the  fifteenth‐century heroine Joan of Arc illustrate, not all women’s visions, words, and works were created equally suspect or equally acceptable.  
We do not question whether Hildegard and Joan actually had mystical experiences, but merely how each woman’s mode of presentation — vision and voice, respectively — affected her credibility. Several factors contribute to the success of a female medieval mystic as author: the form of the mystical experience — vision rather than voice alone —  and  the  authentication  process  by  the  ecclesiastical  authorities.  For  the  vision‐oriented mystic, the process of relaying the mystical message is more difficult, as she has  to  translate  the  visionary  tableau  into  a  text,  whereas  a  voice‐oriented  mystic needs only to repeat the words, which requires less participation on the mystic’s part. We  suggest,  therefore,  that  a  vision  is  simultaneously  both  a  greater  and  a  more indirect  claim  to  authorship  and  authentication,  while  a  voice  is  a  lesser  but  more direct claim. On the one hand, the mystic’s role  in creative translation of a tableau is greater,  but  her  claim  to  authorship  is  less  because  it  is  an  experience  with “intellectual words” (Underhill 1911, 329) that are interpreted as divine. On the other hand, the mystic’s relaying of a voice relegates her to the status of a mere mouthpiece, but  can  at  the  same  time  elevate  her message  to  one  that  derives  directly  from  the ultimate  divine  authorial  source  (Benz  1969,  648–649).2  Hildegard  claimed  in  her mystical  experiences  more  of  a  tableau  presented  as  a  written  text,  while  Joan’s message was both aurally received and orally transmitted, making her less credible as a  medieval  mystical  author.  Some  critics  might  object  here  that  Joan  cannot  be considered  an  author,  as  she  did  not  write  her  own words  down,  but,  by  virtue  of claiming  heavenly  inspiration,  she  situated  herself  much  closer  to  a  claim  for authorship than did most medieval authors, including Hildegard. Furthermore, Joan’s mystical experience — however unsatisfying to her original audience — was written down both by her examiners at Poitiers and by her accusers in Rouen, an action that resembles  the  practice  of  female  medieval  writers  requiring  male  scribes  for authentication  purposes.3  In  Joan’s  case,  however,  the  customary  scribal authentication eventually doomed her.  It is our argument that the female mystic’s self‐categorization into the accepted system of mystical experience — between vision and voice, tableau and text — coupled with her  adherence  to  particular  patriarchal  and  ecclesiastical  expectations,  generally determines  her  success  as mystic  and  author:  in  the  dichotomous  pair  of Hildegard and  Joan,  Hildegard  almost  always  claimed  visions,  foregrounded  her  mystical messages  with  the  politically  and  theologically  correct  rhetoric  of  the  time,  and actively solicited ecclesiastical support, whereas Joan — when pressed to divulge the content of her mystical experiences — claimed only revelation via  inferior voice, did not  foreground  her  mystical  messages  with  the  correct  rhetoric,  and  shunned ecclesiastical  support. That Hildegard died  in her bed at  the age of  eighty‐one while Joan was burned at the stake at the age of seventeen has much to do, we argue, with their respective approach to mystical experience and expression of that experience.  We are, of course, cognizant of the different historical circumstances of Hildegard and Joan. Carolyn Walker Bynum illuminates their differing experience in this regard:   The powerful abbesses of the early Middle Ages are seldom found in the later period.  .  .  .  In  late‐fourteenth‐ and fifteenth‐century hagiography, holy women 
appear more and more  isolated and male‐oriented.  .  .  . Although holy women were,  by  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  more  likely  to  be  lay  and married,  to  reside  in  the  world,  and  to  have  opportunities  for  significant geographical mobility through pilgrimage, they were also more subject to male scrutiny and in greater danger of being accused of heresy or witchcraft. By the time of Catherine of Siena, Bridget of Sweden, and Joan of Arc the influence — even the survival — of pious women depended almost wholly on the success, in ecclesiastical and secular politics, of their male adherents. (1987, 22–23)  Both  despite  and  because  of  the  different  historical  circumstances  described  here, Hildegard  and  Joan  also  illustrate  Jo  Ann  McNamara’s  argument  that  the  status  of mystics  increased  from  the  twelfth  to  the  fourteenth  century,  but  declined  in  the fifteenth  century  (1993,  9–27):  initially  the  help  of  mystics  was  enlisted  against potential  heretics;  then  they  became  heretics  themselves.  First  their  text  was welcomed  and  accepted,  but  later  the  texts  and  their  authors were  denied  validity. Hildegard lived in an era and locale in which mysticism flourished, but Joan was not so fortunate  on  either  count.  In  all  of medieval Western  Europe,  France  can  claim  the fewest number of mystics (Bäurle and Braun 1985, 2; Dinzelbacher 1985, 17–20)4 — and  then  usually  only  ones  who  were  rejected  and  died  for  their  beliefs,  such  as Marguerite  Porète.  Not  only  did  Joan  have  to  suffer  at  the  hands  of  a  hostile ecclesiastical  court,  she  also  had  to  deal  with  a  cultural  climate  unaccustomed  to mystical experiences made public like hers.  Our  essay  intends  to  move  beyond  the  political  level,  however,  by  examining  the possible  textual–philosophical  underpinnings  in  those  logocentric  Middle  Ages  that influenced the divergent fates of Hildegard and Joan. These two women were chosen for our study precisely because they are an opposite pair. Hildegard was a nobly born, educated, cloistered, and middle‐aged nun when she publicized her visions, whereas Joan was an illiterate young shepherdess from a small farm community. Nevertheless, despite  their  differences  in  time,  place,  and  upbringing,  their  common  goal  was  a mission  to  change  what  they  saw  as  great  wrongs  in  their  respective  societies, accompanied by a claim to mystical experiences. Scholars have long been divided over whether either of these women should be considered mystics. By the classic definition of  mysticism,  however,  as  “an  immediate  knowledge  of  God  attained  in  this  life through personal religious experience” (Livingstone 1977, 350),5 both would qualify. Hildegard  is  often  more  specifically  called  a  visionary,  but  almost  every  modern commentary designates her as a mystic.6 Even Hildegard herself refers to her mystical tasks: “I beseech you, my Lord, give me understanding,  that by my account  I may be able  to  make  known  these  mystical  things”  (Hart  and  Bishop  1990,  309).7  More scholars might balk at  Joan’s being called a mystic, but  several have  termed her so.8 And like other medieval mystics, Hildegard and Joan felt called to intervene in church and  state  affairs,  to  complement  mystical  experience  with  commensurate  action (Dinzelbacher  1985,  15).  Both women  perceived  themselves  living  in  an  age with  a pervasive  power  void  and  felt  the  urge  to  act,  albeit with  different  goals.  Hildegard considered her  era  “effeminate”  (Epist.  23,  lines  158–159)  and  the  clergy  lacking  in virility,  while  Joan  mustered  sorely  needed  military  momentum  for  the  French 
kingdom.  Both women were  convinced  that,  paradoxically,  a woman was  needed  to eradicate  the  effeminacy  of  the  age,  and  both  claimed  the  authority  of  mystical experiences  in  this  very  public  mission.  The  crucial  difference  was  how  they encountered  their mystical  experiences,  either  by  vision  or  by  voice.  Before we  can examine Hildegard’s  and  Joan’s mystical  experiences  in  detail,  however, we  need  to look at the theories of mysticism accepted in the Middle Ages and how those informed Hildegard’s presentation of vision and Joan’s presentation of voice.   Both  Hildegard  and  Joan  fit  into  the  classical  hierarchy  of  mystical  experiences  as defined  by  Augustine.  The  three  Augustinian  categories  of  vision  experiences  in descending order of validity are “intellectuale,”  “spiritale,” and “corporale” (12.7.16). The purest  intellectual  visions employ neither  the eyes of  the body nor  those of  the soul (Agaësse and Signac 1972, 12.10.21). In a spiritual vision, the mystic sees with the interior eyes of the soul, while a corporeal vision utilizes the external eyes and is thus the least viable as a mystical experience (12.7.17). Voices, too, can be grouped into a corresponding system: the “inarticulate voice,” one that leaves more of an impression than definite words;  the  “distinct  interior voice,” which speaks  in  clear words but  is recognized  as  being  inside  the  mind;  and  “the  exterior  voice,  which  appears  to  be speaking  externally  to  the  subject  and  to  be  heard  by  the  outward  ear”  (Underhill 1911,  273).  For  the mystic,  the  first  kind  of  voice —  the  kind  Hildegard  of  Bingen experienced —  is  the best. While  the  second  type,  “distinct  interior words,”  is  often treated with suspicion by the hearer (274), because these voices are so precise, they are more  difficult  to  resist,  even  if  the  command  of  the  voices  runs  counter  to  the desires of the hearer (276). The third type, those voices heard by the exterior ear, like Joan of Arc’s, is one that “mystics for the most part regard with suspicion and dislike” (277).  Even  though  Augustine  distinguishes  between  a  vision  and  voice,  in  the  modern scholarly  debate  the  term  vision  is  often  used  to  include  the  auditory.  In  Peter Dinzelbacher’s taxonomic work on vision literature, he provides a comparison of the occurrence of vision and voice in mystical experiences. He distinguishes among visions in  which  the  auditory  plays  a  negligible  role;  visions  in  which  the  auditory  plays  a large role; visions in which the auditory edges out the visual after a short impression; and,  finally, “visions”  in which the auditory replaces the visual entirely. He considers the last two as quasi‐aberrations of the acoustic experiences during a vision and thus a transition to pure audition (1981, 163).9  It  thus appears that a greater emphasis has been  and  is  placed  on  the  visual  experience,  as  even  Evelyn  Underhill  claims  that “visions and voices  .  .  .  are  the media by which  the  ‘seeing self’  truly approaches  the Absolute”  (1911,  323).  William  James  actually  eliminates  from  his  description  of mystical  experience  all  auditory  forms  of  revelation,  with  the  exception  of  music (1961, 320, 330). The term “visionary” for a person experiencing a vision, even when that experience is accompanied by a voice, shows that sight is the privileged mode of perception,  there  being  no  corresponding  term  for  a  person who  undergoes  a  pure “audition,” such as “voiceary.”  
By the twelfth century, the privileged Christian medieval form of mystical experience was vision of God, visio Dei. A plethora of ancient and Christian examples expound on 
visio  Dei  as  the  desired  form  of  communication  with  the  divine,  a  concept  that  is grounded  in  the belief  that  the eyes are  the windows to  the soul  (Riehle 1977, 172–179). With  this widespread endorsement of vision as  the preferred  form of mystical experience,  it  is perhaps not  surprising  that  the  learned Hildegard of Bingen  clearly privileges vision over voice in her mystical experiences. She fits  into the Augustinian hierarchy  the  following  way:  on  her  visions  alone,  she  situates  herself  on  the  two highest rungs of “intellectual” and “imaginary,” and concerning her voices, she claims the  superior  “immediate”  voice  experience.  Her  mystical  experiences  are  featured most prominently in her trilogy of theological–philosophical books, consisting mostly of didactic visions10 — Scivias (1141–1151), Liber vitae meritorum (1158–1163), and 
Liber divinorum operum (1163–1173), as well as many of her  letters.  In and through these, Hildegard was primarily  concerned with  the  authentication of  her  experience and  the  ecclesiastical  sanctioning  of  her  authorship,  a  process  she  pursued  actively and relentlessly. During this process, she assumed the expected humble position of a woman treading on forbidden ground, which makes of heightened interest the candor with  which  she  discusses  the  forms  of  her  mystical  experiences  and  her  rhetorical strategies. All of these measures served to fashion her into the most accepted female authority of  the  twelfth  century  and helped  to  assure  the orthodoxy of  her mystical experiences  and  to  validate  her  as  an  author  in  the  eyes  of  the  ecclesiastical authorities.  Hildegard’s  three  visionary  books  contain  introductions  explaining  her  authorial activity and emphasizing the authentication of her visions. The prologue to her Scivias, the most  extensive  of  the  three  prologues,  best  illuminates  her mystical  experience and visionary mission. Every one of her visions has two parts: first a description of her vision, then an allegorical interpretation. Occasionally, a heavenly voice addresses her to clarify points. In the Scivias prologue, Hildegard explains: “I saw a heavenly vision . . . in which resounded a voice from Heaven” (“uidi maximum splendorem, in quo facta est  uox  de  caelo”)  (Hart  and  Bishop  1990,  59).  Her  visions  are  flamelike  —  like Ezekiel’s — and the voice clearly commands, “Say and write what you see and hear” (“dic  et  scribe  quae uides  et  audis”),  further  delineating  the  parameters  of  both her experience and authorship:   But since you are timid in speaking, and simple in expounding, and untaught in writing,  speak  and write  these  things not by  a human mouth,  and not by  the understanding  of  human  invention,  and  not  by  the  requirements  of  human composition, but as you see and hear them on high in the heavenly places in the wonders of God. Explain these things  in such a way that  the hearer, receiving the words  of  his  instructor, may  expound  them  in  those words,  according  to that will,  vision and  instruction. Thus  therefore, O human,  speak  these  things that  you  see  and  hear.  And write  them  not  by  yourself  or  any  other  human being, but by the will of Him Who knows, sees and disposes of all things in the secrets of His mysteries. (Hart and Bishop 1990, 59)11  
This passage addresses several key concerns. First, it paints Hildegard as humble and unpolished, a reluctant Moses‐like medium who assumes the risky task of authorship only  after  the  repeated  command  from God  the Master Author  and,  as  she  relates  a page later, only after she has refused and has been subsequently struck down by God with  illness.  All  of  these  humility  gestures,  of  course,  served  to  release  her  from potential  criticism  by  the  patriarchal  hierarchy.  Second,  she  has  also  been  liberated from the constraints of scholastic rhetoric, a statement that can be taken as an implicit criticism of a system that did not grant women the same scholastic education as men.12 Third,  the visions and  instructions are geographically  fixed  in  “heavenly places,” not on earth. The prologue testifies also to her being one of St. Matthew’s pure‐hearted, as she  is  said  to have visions because she  is pure  in spirit (Scivias, 1,  lines 45–46). The prologues  of  her  other  two  visionary  books  contain  similar,  shorter  authenticating passages, with the last book showing the least humility,  implying that over the years she felt more sure as a prophetess and gained confidence as an author.  In  a  letter  to  Guibert  of  Gembloux,  who  later  became  her  secretary,  Hildegard discusses  the quality of her visions as both  intellectual  and spiritual  and establishes herself as a visionary according to the biblical example of Enoch:   But ever since I was a child .  .  . I have always seen this vision in my soul, right up to the present time, when I am over seventy, and my soul, just as God willed, climbs  in  this  vision,  through  the  changes  of  atmosphere,  to  the  top  of  the firmament and spreads itself out amongst different peoples, although they are a long way  away  from me  in  distant  regions  and  places.  And  since  I  see  these things  in  this  way  in  my  soul,  I  therefore  also  see  them  according  to  the changing of  the  clouds  and of  other  creatures. But  I  do not hear  these  things with my outer ears, nor do I perceive them with the rational parts of my mind, nor with any combination of my five senses; but only in my soul, with my outer eyes  open,  so  that  I  never  suffer  in  them  any  unconsciousness  induced  by ecstasy. (Bowie and Davies 1990, 145)13  Hildegard “sees” with the eyes of the soul, which makes her visions spiritual. They are not sought out by her but appear before her, as her soul climbs to geographically fixed “heavenly  places,”  and  thus  her  visions  also  qualify  as  “intellectual”  and  highly acceptable.  She  is  quick  to  disavow  further  physical  involvement  by  rejecting  the influences  of  ecstasy,  although  this  sets  her  apart  from  many  mystical  authors, including Augustine (Baumgardt 1948, 281 ).14 One reason for her rejection of ecstasy might  be  its  corporeality,  making  the  experience  suspect  as  to  its  effectiveness  in providing validation.15  In the same letter, Hildegard renounces even more of the corporeal sensory aspect of her visions and makes a crucial distinction between what she sees and what she hears:   Whatever I see or learn in this vision, I hold in my memory for a long time; so that when  I  recall what  I have seen and heard,  I  simultaneously see and hear and understand and, as  it were,  learn  in this moment, what  I understand. But 
what  I  do  not  see,  I  do  not  understand,  because  I  am  unlearned.  And what  I write in the vision, I see and hear; nor do I put down words other than those I hear in the vision, and I present them in Latin, unpolished, just as I hear them in the vision. For I am not taught in this vision to write as the philosophers write; and the words in this vision are not like those which sound from the mouth of man, but like a trembling flame, or like a cloud stirred by the clear air. (Bowie and Davies 1990, 146)16  Thus, Hildegard  asserts  that  she does not  understand what  she does not  see, which implies  that  voice  alone  would  not  suffice  to  relate  the  message.  Even  when  she acknowledges  the  auditory  aspects  of  her  visions,  she  paints  another  tableau:  not  a human  voice,  but  a  flame  or  a  cloud,  traditional  Old  Testament  images  of  God, especially  as  experienced by Moses or Ezekiel.17 The voices,  then,  are of  the highest intellectual kind and eradicate any human verbal aspect in favor of the highest visual imagery. This puts Hildegard on  the  top rung of mystical experience and asserts  the importance for her and other mystics of vision over voice. 
  Furthermore,  to  cement  validation  of  her  experiences,  Hildegard  used  the  correct rhetorical  topoi;  she wrote  in Latin,  the  language of  the Church.  “It  has been  rightly suggested,”  Emilie  Zum  Brunn  and  Georgette  Epiney‐Burgard  insist,  “that  neither Meister Eckhardt nor Marguerite [Porète] would have been condemned if their works had appeared only in Latin . . . Hildegard . . . wrote, or dictated, in the language of the Church, although she herself said she was not conversant in the Latin of philosophers. Thus she belonged to the domain reserved to the clergy, since she used their language and had received approbation from the Pope and the Synod of Trier” (1989, xxii, xxiii).  Hildegard’s  superior auditory experience  is matched by her visionary experience,  as she distinguishes between two different kinds of  light, producing two different kinds of vision: “The light which I see . . . is known to me by the name of the ‘reflection of the living  light.’  .  .  .  In  the  same  light  I  sometimes  (but  infrequently)  see  another  light which  is  known  to me  by  the  name  of  the  living  light,  but when  and  how  I  see  it,  I cannot tell” (Bowie and Davies 1990, 145, 146).18 The first platonic light is the medium of most of her visionary  images, but  in  the Living Light  she achieved vision without any  sensory  knowledge  or  explanation,  a  true  visio  intellectualis.  Such  a  vision  is especially  crucial  against  the backdrop of her  search  for  approval  from  the mystical authority  sine qua non, Bernard, who eschewed everything but  the most  intellectual type of vision.19  If  Hildegard  can  be  placed  on  the  highest  rung  of  mystical  experience,  that  of  the intellectual  visionary,  then  Joan  must  be  placed  on  the  lowest,  that  of  the  purely corporeal — and the purely external at that — an issue that was to loom large in her Condemnation trial. In relating her first mystical experience, she insisted that she had only  heard  a  voice  —  an  external  voice  that  came  from  her  father’s  garden, accompanied merely by a bright light (Champion 1976, 49–50; Barrett 1931, 65),20 the only similarity in the experiences of Hildegard and Joan. In fact, Joan’s voices seemed only to take on form when she was pressed by the examiners at her trial to describe 
them (Warner 1981, 120–121; Lang 1895, 202).21 She resorted to naming them as the most  popular  saints  in  French  folk  piety  and  her  personal  favorites:  the  traditional guardian of  the Franks,  St. Michael;  the  rhetorician,  St.  Catherine of Alexandria;  and the saintly cross‐dresser, St. Margaret of Antioch (Wood 1988, 136–137; Tanz 1991, 127–134),  claiming,  “I  saw  them with my  bodily  eyes  as well  as  I  see  you”  (Barrett 69).22  Despite  this  assertion  of  the  visionary  nature  of  her  experience,  Joan’s descriptions of what she saw were conventional, containing the standard iconography of  light,  crowns,  and wings  (Warner  1981,  126,  132–136).  First,  she  sees  only  light (Champion  38,  47,  55–56,  122;  Barrett  55,  63,  70,  114),  with  no  physical  form (Champion  45–46,  47–48;  Barrett  61,  63),  accompanied  by  a  voice  so  ethereal  in nature  that  sometimes  she  cannot  understand what  it  is  saying  (Champion 52,  122; Barrett 67, 114);  later, the speakers are described as wearing crowns (Champion 52, 64;  Barrett  68,  78),  but  Joan  resists  pressure  to  provide  any  further  description, appealing  instead  to  the  records  of  her  examination  at  Poitiers  (Champion  53–54; Barrett 68–69); eventually, she admits to seeing their faces (Champion 64; Barrett 78) and even to touching them (Champion 152–153; Barrett 129–130), but when pressed, she  cannot  describe  them  (Champion  64;  Barrett  78),  finally  insisting,  “You  already have my reply on this matter, and you will get none other from me. I have answered you as best I can” (Barrett 125–126).23  It  is striking that,  throughout her Condemnation trial,  the emphasis of her testimony was on  the orality  of  her  revelations,  on  voice  rather  than vision,  on hearing  rather than seeing:   Asked if since Tuesday she had not spoken with St. Catherine and St. Margaret, she answered yes, but she does not know at what time.  Asked on what day, she answered, yesterday and today; “there is no day but I hear them.”  Asked if she always saw them in the same dress, she answered she always sees them  in  the  same  form;  and  their  heads  are  richly  crowned.  Of  their  outer clothing she does not speak; of their robes she knows nothing.  Asked  how  she  knew  whether  the  apparition  was  man  or  woman,  she answered she knew for certain, she recognized them by their voices, and they revealed themselves  to her; nor did she know anything but by revelation and God’s command.  Asked what part of them she saw, she answered the face.  Asked if the saints which appeared to her had hair, she answered: “It’s well to know that they have.”  Asked  if  there  were  anything  between  their  crowns  and  their  hair,  she answered no. 
 Asked if their hair was long and hung down, she answered: “I do not know.” She added  that  she  did  not  know whether  they  appeared  to  have  arms  or  other members.  She  saw  they  spoke  very well  and beautifully;  and  she understood them very well.  Asked how  they  spoke  if  they had no other members,  she  answered:  “I  leave that to God.” She said the voice was gentle, soft and low, and spoke in French. (Barrett 78–79)24  Consistently  in exchanges such as these,25  Joan refused to answer questions on what she might  have  seen —  a  charge  laid  heavily  against  her  in  the  Ordinary  trial,  that concerning  her  visions  (her  accusers’ word)  (Champion  101–102,  203;  Barrett  103, 171), “she refuses to declare them sufficiently by word or sign; but did and still does put off, contradict and refuse” (Barrett 171).26 Despite her reluctance to tell what she had seen, she did not, however, hesitate to describe the voice  in detail,  the orality of her  mystical  experience  reflected  in  her  testimony  that  she  “recognize[d]  them  by their  voices”  (“cognoscit  eas  ad  voces  ipsarum”)  (Champion  64;  Barrett  78)  and distinguished among them by their “greeting” (“salutationem”) (Champion 53; Barrett 68).  Although Joan seemed to follow her questioners’ lead in identifying her voices — if the examiners referred to a voice, so did she; if they called the voice by a name, she did as well (Wood 1988, 236); if they insisted Gabriel appeared to her, she finally conceded that he did27 — her  judges seemed willing to accept her terminology, of voice rather than  vision:  in  Article  X  of  the  seventy  drawn  up  after  the  Preparatory  trial,  for example,  the  accusations  use  the  words  “visions”  and  “revelations,”  but  when  a summary is given of Joan’s own testimony in response to those accusations, the term “voice” (or “voices”) — and only that term — appears, including twenty‐five times in Article X alone (Champion 177–180; Barrett 146–151). Keeping in mind that we only have her accusers’ record of what she said — and that she complained that they only wrote down what was said against her (Pernoud 1955, 202) — we find this emphasis on  voice  striking,  especially  given  that when  the  twelve  articles were  drawn  up  on which  she  was  to  be  convicted,  the  focus  dramatically  changed:  in  that  purported summary  of  Joan’s  experiences,  they  are  presented  not  as  verbal  but  as  visual  and corporeal,  those  of  body,  eyes,  form,  appearance,  flesh,  sight,  touch,  physicality (Champion 270–272; Barrett 227). These were the articles read and voted on by the theologians at the University of Paris — and yet, when Joan was admonished by that body, the articles read to her, once again, referred primarily to voices (Champion 352–353; Barrett 301). Even so, it is the visual aspect that appears, this time with no orality at all,  in  the  letters written after  Joan’s execution (Champion 402–408; Barrett 339–345) by England’s Henry VI, who had been the one to insist on her ecclesiastical trial (Champion 404–405; Barrett 344).  For Marina Warner the major issue of that trial is the “nature of [Joan’s] voices” (1981, 118); for W. S. Scott, it is submission to the church (1974, 106). Actually, as we show 
here,  it  was  both.  But  in  the  Nullification  trial,  submission  to  the  church  was  the foremost question;  the  issue of  Joan’s  voices was practically nonexistent. As Charles Wayland  Lightbody  points  out,  “It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Church  avoided pronouncing  on  the  divine  inspiration  of  Joan’s  ‘Voices,’  in  the  Process  of Rehabilitation.  This  touchy  question  was  left  over  for  the  controversies  of  future generations” (1961, 140). At the Nullification trial, those who mention her voices at all are  few — her confessor,  Jean Pasqueral;  two of her companions,  Jean de Metz, who talks  about her  “brothers  in Paradise,”  and  Jean d’Aulon;  the one  remaining witness from Poitiers, Séguin de Séguin; and a few of her former judges at Rouen, Jean Fabri, Pierre Miget, Martin Ladvenu, Jean Beaupère, and Thomas de Courcelles, still skeptical as  to  the divine nature of  the  voices — and  almost  always  as  a  “voice”  or  “counsel” (Pernoud  1955,  162,  166,  87,  101,  191–193,  200,  215,  226,  229;  Lang  1895,  208). Furthermore,  mention  of  the  voices  is  lacking  entirely  from  either  of  the  articles concerning  points  on which witnesses were  sworn  to  answer  (Pernoud  1955,  251–260).  Joan’s Condemnation trial experience also gives us a glimpse of her role in the process of establishing the authority of her mystical text. In the text that comes down to us, we can see creation of her experience through its fine‐tuning — her rewriting, as it were. In  fact,  in  a more general  sense,  Joan was  allowed  to  “rewrite” her  testimony at  the conclusion of  the Preparatory trial  (Barrett 156–157; Champion 132–133) when she asked  “that  the questions and answers should be read consecutively  to her and  that which  was  read  without  contradiction  on  her  part  she  allowed  to  be  true  and confessed”  (Barrett  133).28  At  the  conclusion  of  the  reading  and  after  some modifications  of  the  text,  “Jeanne  confessed  that  she  believed  she  had  spoken  well according  to what had been written  in  the register and read  to her”  (Barrett 133).29 Despite  these  revisions,  the  final  conclusion  of  her  judges  at  Rouen  was  that  her revelations  were  “fictitious”  (“ficta”)  (Champion  289;  Barrett  338)  —  a  word  that suggests  the  failure  of  her  text  to  convince  her  audience  as  to  its  basis  in  actual experience.  In contrast, Hildegard never had  to submit  to an ecclesiastical  trial, but she had  two ecclesiastical  favors  to  seek:  authentication  of  her  visions  and  validation  by  the Church.  She  achieved  the  former  by  claiming  God  as  the  source  of  her  visions.  For instance, in the prologue to her Scivias, Hildegard immediately asserts her visio Dei in the headline “These Are True Visions Flowing from God” (Hart and Bishop 1990, 59),30 thus insisting that a demonic source was out of the question and affirming that even in the  words  she  repeats  she  had  authority  from  the  highest  source  of  logocentric creation in Christ, the Word himself. Claims of authenticity, which are usually provided by that visionary voice, are woven throughout the Scivias and Liber divinorum operum, but they are extensive in the Liber vitae meritorum. In Vision One of Book Two in the 
Scivias, Hildegard  is  told:  “You may not  see  anything  further  regarding  this mystery unless it is granted you by a miracle of faith” (Hart and Bishop 1990, 149).31 In Vision Four of Book Three, the voice of her vision makes it unmistakably clear what its source is:  “And as  I  looked at  this,  I heard  from Heaven a  terrifying voice,  rebuking me and saying,  ‘What  you  see  is  divine!’”  (357).32  Although  her  descriptions  of  the  visions 
contain many references to divine iconography, such as Hildegard’s description of God on his  throne,  the divinity of  the voice accompanying her visions  is most clearly and beautifully  stated  in  the  Liber  vitae  meritorum.  Hildegard’s  visions  are  repeatedly accompanied (more than thirty times) by the sentence “These things that you see are true,  and  as  you  see  them,  so  they  are”  (Hozeski  1994,  47).33  Since  this  work  of Hildegard’s strikes a heavy exhortatory note to sinners, she constantly reinforces her claims  to  the veracity of her visions. But  it  is after  the extensive pronouncements of the  voice  that  the  visions  are  true  that  the  voice  from heaven34  reveals  itself  as  the Logos in his redemptive mission — the voice is therefore foregrounded by the vision. Found  at  the  end  of  the  Liber  vitae  meritorum,  the  statement  is  a  summary  of redemptive  history  from  the  viewpoint  of  Christ  as  he  experiences  his  part  in  it.  It contains passages like this: “I am the power of the Divinity, which was before eternity and before time and which did not even have a beginning in time, for I am the power of the Divinity by which God made all things that are to be discerned and probed .  .  .  .  I then  became  like  a  flame,  and  approaching  the womb  of  the  Virgin,  I  rested  in  it.  I became  incarnate  in  her  flesh”  (Hozeski  1994,  283,  284).35  Hildegard  effectively authenticated her visions as sent from God by the use of an appropriate, theologically correct spokesperson, Jesus the Logos, an authentication that Joan of Arc, in contrast, did not claim, resorting instead to angels and saints popular  in her time and place, a strategy that might have weakened the already tenuous position of an adolescent girl claiming to hear voices from heaven.  To  achieve  the  second  objective,  authorization  by  the  Church,  Hildegard  looked  to others  besides  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  for  ecclesiastical  support  and  sanction.  She enlisted  the  support of  three different ecclesiastics: her  scribe Volmar, Bernard,  and Pope  Eugenius  III.  As  her  scribe,  Volmar  helped  with  her  first  rite  of  passage  into authorship.  Many  medieval  women  writers,  even  if  they  themselves  could  write, employed  scribes  for  two  reasons.  First,  a  male  scribe  —  usually  a  cleric  —  lent credibility  to  a  female  author36  and  could  speed  her  acceptance,  since  through  this method  a  male  member  of  the  Church  at  least  implicitly  sanctioned  what  she  had created.  Second,  scribes  allowed women  to maintain  the  appearance  of  illiteracy  as part  of  donning  the  wimple  of  humility.  The  manuscript  illustration  titled  “The Seeress” on the first page of the Scivias exposes the ambiguity of Hildegard’s humility; she  is  shown  sitting  in  the middle  of  the  arch  of  a  small  room, writing  on  a  tablet, visibly inspired by flamelike light from above, while Volmar is sitting outside the arch of  the  room,  literally  marginalized,  with  only  his  head  peeking  into  the  realm  of Hildegard. He is entirely idle, holding what could be another empty tablet, but clearly not  engaged  in  any  writing  at  that  point.  As  this  illustration  shows,  Volmar  was present to authenticate Hildegard’s vision and creative process, but he assumed only ancillary status as a scribe, merely copying her first drafts and smoothing out stylistic blemishes.  Yet  Volmar  was  credited  as  recently  as  1930  with  the  writing  of  her visions.37  But Hildegard went beyond authentication by a male scribe. In 1146–1147, Hildegard wrote to Bernard to ask for his blessing on her endeavor, an astute move, as he was considered the most eminent authority of his day on mysticism: 
  Through  this  vision  which  touches  my  heart  and  soul  like  a  burning  flame, teaching me  profundities  of meaning,  I  have  an  inward  understanding  of  the Psalter,  the  Gospels,  and  other  volumes.  Nevertheless,  I  do  not  receive  this knowledge in German. Indeed, I have no formal training at all, for I know how to read only on the most elementary level, certainly with no deep analysis. But please  give  me  your  opinion  in  this  matter,  because  I  am  untaught  and untrained in exterior material, but am only taught inwardly, in my spirit. (Baird and Ehrman 1994, 28)38  In this letter, Hildegard emphasizes her need for ecclesiastical confirmation, due to her self‐proclaimed  “elementary”  literacy  and  understanding,  and  especially  denies  the use  of  the  vernacular  in  her  visions.  Hildegard  adds  to  this  that  she  is  seeking Bernard’s  advice  because  she  is  afraid  of  heresies,  a  reference  to  the many women drawn  to  the  heretical  sects  of  the  twelfth  century.  Bernard’s  reply  to  Hildegard assures  her  of  the  orthodoxy  of  her  visions  because  they  fall  into  the  intellectual category  he  so  favored  (Epist.  II).  Additionally,  Bernard  supported  her  cause  with Pope Eugenius, whom she petitioned next.  In 1148, a  letter accompanying a part of her Scivias was sent  to Pope Eugenius and, while Hildegard again presented herself humbly,  this  letter has a  certain  immediacy and urgency that  implies  that even an  infallible pope might not know everything: “O gentle father, poor little woman though I am, I have written those things to you which God  saw  fit  to  teach me  in  a  true  vision,  by mystic  inspiration”  (Baird  and  Ehrman 1994, 32).39 Both the issue of authentication — hence the reference to God’s command — and a possible criticism feature here: “Therefore,  I send this  letter to you now, as God has instructed me. And my spirit desires that the Light of Light shine in you and purify your eyes and arouse your spirit to your duty concerning my writings, so that your  soul may be  crowned, which will  be pleasing  to God.  In  their  instability, many people, those wise in worldly things, disparage these writings of mine, criticizing me, a poor creature formed from a rib, ignorant of philosophical matters” (32).40 Two points stand out: Hildegard’s  implication  that either  some ecclesiastics or Eugenius himself are too worldly, and her advice to Eugenius to have the same purity of sight in judging her writing that Matthew requires and that she possesses. She closes the letter with an admonition,  “Do  not  spurn  these  mysteries  of  God,  because  they  have  a  necessity which  lies  hidden  and  has  not  yet  been  revealed”  (33).41  Subsequently,  the  pope approved her writings and  thereby validated her  status as prophetess. Given  such a mark  of  approval,  it  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  several  years  later  Hildegard  felt  she could chastise Eugenius — for his stance toward the emperor — as well as many other political and ecclesiastical figures during her lifetime, often strengthened by her claim to true visions, which the Church authorities had validated for her in the first place.42  For  Joan,  the process of authorizing her voices was entirely different, as  she did not seek ecclesiastical support in the first place, perhaps because as a laywoman she was not as  theologically aware as Hildegard or because she demonstrated  the distrust of the  unlettered  for  the  learned.  Given  the  duplicity  of  her  examiners  at  Rouen,43  it 
comes  as  no  surprise  that  Joan  was  reluctant  (what  her  judges  called  obstinate) (Champion  317–318;  Barrett  273)  to  discuss  her  mystical  experiences:  a  constant refrain in her trial was to insist “I will not tell you” (“Ego non dicam hoc vobis”) or to request  “pass  that  question”  (“Transeatis  ultra”)  (Barrett  46; Champion  41).  Unlike Hildegard, who was  ordered  by  the  voice  accompanying  her  visions  to  reveal  those visions, Joan felt compelled to keep her revelations secret (Champion 93; Barrett 101): “She replied that concerning her father and her mother and what she had done since she  had  taken  the  road  to  France,  she  would  gladly  swear;  but  concerning  the revelations  from God,  these  she  had  never  told  or  revealed  to  anyone,  save  only  to Charles whom she called King; nor would she reveal them to save her head” (Barrett 50).44 Later  she modifies  this  list:  “Asked  if  she had not  spoken  to her priest or any other churchman of  the visions which she claimed to have she answered no, save  to Robert de Baudricourt and to her king” (Barrett 101).45 Whether she told one person or two seems to be of little importance; what is obvious is that, perhaps because of this compulsion  to  keep  her  counsel  secret  (Champion  29–30;  Barrett  50),  Joan  never sought  to  have  her  revelations  sanctioned  by  the  Church.  Although  she  heard  the voices as often as  three  times a week,  she  remained silent about  them  for over  four years — much  like Hildegard, who  saw  visions  for  half  her  life  before  she  revealed them  —  and  when  Joan  finally  did  reveal  them,  she  did  so  strictly  to  secular authorities. This became a major issue in her Condemnation trial. Warner paraphrases the trial records on this point:   She was . . . accused that though she proclaimed her belief in her voices as firm as her faith,  .  .  . she had not consulted a bishop or a priest about her voices to receive  their  approval.  Joan  had  trespassed  gravely.  It  mattered  less  what colours one  flew than who bestowed these colours;  the ritual was  legitimised only by the legitimacy of the performer, not by the words themselves. Joan had never told anyone about her voices; she had not obeyed them because they had been approved by a man of the Church. She had not told her confessor, not any of the high ecclesiastics she met later. Her voices had remained a private affair, and  as  a  laywoman  she  had  no  right  to  trust  in  them  without  the  formal permission of the Church. (1981, 228)  In  this,  Joan  was  no  different  than  many  other  medieval  mystics.  As  W.  T.  Jones explains:   To the Church as an institution, the mystic is a maverick. He is a nonconformist and a troublemaker; he upsets efficiently functioning procedures; he rejects the authority  of  the  institution whenever  it  conflicts with  his  private  vision.  The weight  of  numbers  and  of  persons,  traditions,  convenience,  decency,  and respectability count for him as nothing in comparison with his inner conviction. Indeed,  too  large  a  dose  of mysticism  can  destroy  even  the most  efficient  of institutions.  Under  the  circumstances,  what  is  surprising  is  the  Church’s remarkable capacity  for keeping  the Christian mystics within  its  fold, and not only keeping them there but using them to revitalize itself . . . . In general, with 
such  individualists  the Church has a simple alternative:  It can either canonize them or expel them as heretics. It cannot ignore them. (1969, 56)46  In the case of Joan, of course, the Church did both: first it condemned her as a heretic, then elevated her as a saint.   If  we  accept  Warner’s  assertion,  then  we  must  seemingly  discount  the  clergy  who examined  Joan  at  Poitiers — but  Joan  seems  to  have  done  that  very  thing  herself.47 Although she appealed to the records at Poitiers to bolster her answers concerning her revelations  (Champion  53–54;  Barrett  68–69),  indicating  that  she  understood  the importance of having written validation and verification of her voices similar to that given  to  Hildegard  through  scribal  transcription  of  her  visions,  Joan  insisted,  upon direct examination, that “for believing in her revelations she did not ask the advice of bishop or priest or any other” (Barrett 190).48 Her judges at Rouen hammered away at this  point,  in  obvious  disregard  for  whatever  the  decision  of  the  committee  of examiners at Poitiers had been to sanction her mission — and, presumably, her voices (Champion  56–57;  Barrett  71).  Instead,  her  accusers  in  Rouen,  slightly  overstating their  case,  complained  that  concerning  her  revelations,  “she  consulted  no  bishop, priest  or  other  prelate  of  the  Church,  or  any  other  cleric  to  discover  whether  she should give credence to such spirits; and declares that she was forbidden by her voices to  reveal  these  communications  to  anyone  except  a  captain  of  soldiers,  to  the  said Charles, and  to other purely secular persons”  (Barrett 190).49 Even after  twenty‐five years,  in  testimony  at  her Nullification  trial,  one  of  those who  had  examined  her  at Rouen complained that she had “been examined and not rebuked” (“a été examinée et non reprinse”) (Pernoud 1955, 205; Quicherat 1965, 17) by those in Poitiers.  What made this so galling to the Inquisition at Rouen was that in this failure to obtain Church sanction — in her “individualism of thought,” as W. S. Scott puts it (1974, 140) — Joan seemed to be claiming direct authority from God, but without either the direct authorship  of  reported  vision —  transmission  of  text — or  the  authorization  of  the Church that Hildegard so enjoyed.50 This latter point is critical. Joan’s accusers insisted that  as  “an  unlettered  and  ignorant  woman”  (“mulier  illiterata  et  ignorans”) (Champion 305; Barrett 264), she must submit to their  instruction, as Hildegard had done voluntarily. Furthermore, they claimed that Joan lacked a sign, especially the sign of  humility51  that  Hildegard  did  so  much  to  cultivate.  This  disparagement  of  her character  (“qualitate  personae”)  (Champion  338;  Barrett  289)  was  phrased  as criticism of the text of her life as well as of her revelations. She was commanded by the Inquisition “to reform yourself and your sayings and correct them by submitting your acts and your words  to  the Church, and by accepting her  judgment”  (Barrett 307).52 Like  editors  in  a  publishing  house,  her  judges  seem  to  be  asking  for  an  extensive rewrite of both her  life and her experiences — a revision,  if we can use  the word of Joan,  of  her  implicit  and  explicit  text  creation.  Joan’s  failure  in  this  creation  and  its subsequent authorization resulted — in sharp contrast with Hildegard’s successes in these areas — in Joan’s judges declaring that “These revelations so invented had been as  it were  the  root which  had  induced  her  to  so many  other  crimes”  (Barrett  274–275);53 in other words, her revelations had led her to heresy in the view of at least that 







NOTES  1. McGinn elaborates further that the move from orality to written record “illustrates the transition from oral to written sacred communication characteristic of the whole late ancient world” (1991, 85–86).  2. Benz  claims  that  heavenly  dictation  as  a  visionary  method  ranges  from  Old Testament prophecy to early Christian vision literature to Swedenborg. In his index of visionaries (1969, 657), starting with the Apostle Paul and ending with Sadhu Sundar Singh (1930), Benz does not name Joan of Arc, yet many secondary sources mistakenly call her experiences visions.  3. Joan faced the Inquisition three times. The first was an examination in Poitiers. The next  two  were  actual  trials,  the  Ordinary  and  the  Condemnation  trials  in  Rouen. Twenty‐four  years  later,  the  Nullification  trial  reversed  the  charge  of  heresy  — although a bit too late for Joan.  4. Dinzelbacher  lists  the  only  French  women  with  mystical  experiences  in  the thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries  as  Alpais  de  Cudot  (1211),  Marguerite  Porète (1310),  Doucelina  de  Digne  (1214–1274),  Beatrix  de  Ornacieux  (1303),  and Marguerite d’Oingt (1310) (1985, 17–20).  5.  For other definitions of mysticism,  see Weeks 1993,  1–13,  especially 3,  7,  9;  Zum Brunn and Epiney‐Burgard 1989, xiii‐xxxiv, especially xvii–xviii.  6. Liebeschütz  notes  that  her  mode  is  closer  to  prophetism  (1930,  51).  McGinn classifies her as a pure visionary (1994, 333–337).  7.  “‘Rogo  te,  mi  Domine,  ut  mihi  des  intellectum,  quatenus  possim  enarrabiliter proferre haec mystica”‘ (Scivias, 2:3.1, lines 80–81).  8. Among those who call Joan a mystic: Barstow 1986, Beer 1991, Bynum 1991, Heer 1962,  Lerner  1993,  Michelet  1967,  Stolpe  1956,  Underhill  1911,  Zum  Brunn  and Epiney‐Burgard 1989.  
9. Despite Dinzelbacher’s  final  two categories,  the preferred but not always accurate term  employed  in  the  scholarly  discussion  is  vision;  audition  is  scarcely  used. Dinzelbacher excludes Hildegard from his study, as he sees her as an exception to his taxonomy.  10. On a discussion of didactic visions, see Liebeschütz 1930, 42–56.  11.  “Sed  quia  timida  es  ad  loquendum  et  simplex  ad  exponendum  et  indocta  ad scribendum ea, dic et scribe illa non secundum os hominis nec secundum intellectum humanae  adinuentionis  nec  secundum  uoluntatem  humanae  compositionis,  sed secundem  id quod ea  in caelestibus desuper  in mirabilibus Dei uides et audis, ea sic edisserendo proferens,  quemadmodum et  auditor uerba praeceptoris  sui percipiens, ea  secundum  tenorem  locutionis  illius,  ipso  uolente,  ostendente  et  preacipiente propalat. Sic ergo et tu, o homo, dic ea quae uides et audis; et scribe ea non secundum te  nec  secundum  alium  hominem,  sed  secundum  uolentatem  scientis,  uidentis  et disponentis omnia in secretis mysteriorum suorum” (Scivias, 1, lines 10–21).  12.  Note  that  the  approach  of  medieval  religious  writers  “was,  in  fact,  quite  the contrary to that of the scholastic doctors” (Zum Brunn and Epiney‐Burgard 1989, xiv). Ursula Peters postulates that men were more liable to write on theology and pastoral care, while women specialized in visionary literature and elaborate saints’ lives (1988, 46). See also Wilson 1984, ix.  13. “Ab infantia autem mea . . . uisionis huius munere in anima mea usque ad presens tempus  semper  fruor,  cum  iam  plus  quam  septuaginta  annorum  sim.  Spiritus  uero meus,  prout  Deus  uult,  in  hac  uisione  sursum  in  altitudinern  firmamenti  et  in uicissitudinem diuersi aeris ascendit, atque inter diuersos populos se dilatat, quamuis in  longinquis  regionibus  et  locis  a me  remoti  sint.  Et  quoniam  hec  tali modo  uideo, idcirco etiam secundum uicissitudinem nubium et aliarum creaturarum ea conspicio. Ista  autem  nec  corporeis  auribus  audio  nec  cogitationibus  cordis  mei,  nec  ulla collatione  sensuum  meorum  quinque  percipio,  sed  tantum  in  anima  mea,  apertis exterioribus oculis, ita ut numquam in eis defectum extasis patiar; sed uigilanter die ac nocte illa uideo” (Epist. CIII, lines 62–75).  14. Even Augustine discusses ecstasy in positive terms; see McGinn 1991, 237–243. In contrast with Hildegard’s denial of ecstatic experience is Joan’s embracing of it. Joan’s descriptions of her own ecstatic experience — “the sweetness and pleasure of  it,” as Marina Warner puts it (1981, 124) — show her to be gripped by “the dulcedo Dei, the intense rapture of Julian of Norwich, or Richard Rolle” (125). Nevertheless, as Warner points out, Joan was also known for her “levelheadedness . . . at a time when hysterical raptures,  self‐inflicted  pain,  and  fits  of  demon‐conquering were  the  hallmark  of  the visionary” (78); hence, as so often was true of Joan, even the descriptions she offered of her ecstatic experience were not enough  to make  these experiences acceptable  to her listeners.  
15. True intellectual vision was also advocated by Hildegard’s contemporary Rupert of Deutz, but Rupert is less emphatic on the authenticity issue because, as a male author, he was not in as much need of validation. See Newman 1985, 173 and McGinn 1994, 328–333.  16. “‘Quidquid autem in hac uisione uidere seu didicero, huius memoriam per longum tempus  habeo,  ita  quod,  quoniam  illud  aliquando  uiderim  et  audierim,  recordor.  Et simul uideo et audio ac scio, et quasi in momento hoc quod scio disco. Quod autem non uideo, illud nescio, quia indocta sum. Et ea que scribo, illa in uisione uideo et audi, nec alia  uerba  pono  quam  illa  que  audio,  latinisque  uerbis  non  limatis  ea  profero quemadmodum  illa  in  uisione  audio,  quoniam  sicut  philosophi  scribunt  scribere  in uisione hac non doceor. Atque uerba que in uisione ista uideo et audio, non sunt sicut uerba que ab ore hominis sonant, sed sicut flamma coruscans et ut nubes in aere puro mota” (Epist. CIII, lines 84–95).  17. For a detailed account of Ezekiel’s vision in religion and literature, see Lieb 1991.  18. “Lumen igitur quod video . . . illudque umbra uiuentis luminis mihi nominatur . . . Et in  eodem  lumine  aliam  lucem,  que  lux  uiuens  mihi  nominata  est,  interdum  et  non frequentur  aspicio,  quam  nimirum  quomodo  uideam  multo  minus  quam  priorem proferre sufficio” (Epist. CIII, lines 78, 80–81, 97–99, 261–262).  19.  See McGinn  1994,  208.  In  the writings  of  Symeon  the New Theologian,  a  tenth‐century Byzantine mystic, vision is also treated as superior to voice. For an extended argument for Symeon’s case, see Karrer 1948 and Haas 1975.  20.  From here  onwards  in  the  notes,  page  numbers  only will  be  given  for  the  Latin quotations from Champion and for the English translations from Barrett.  21.  Johan Huizinga, somewhat  inaccurately, claims that “Joan’s heavenly counsel was quite  without  visual  form,  a  sheer  daimonion  about  which  she  talked  with  great diffidence and reticence. She speaks only of son conseil [‘her counsel’] . . . Even during the  hearings  she  was  very  little  inclined  to  go  into  detail  about  her  visions.  Asked about  the  great  light  accompanying  them,  she  said:  passez  oultre  [‘pass  to  another question’]” (1959, 223–224). While Huizinga is correct to put the emphasis on the oral rather  than  on  the  visual,  Joan’s  descriptions,  while  lacking  substance,  were  not entirely devoid of visual aspects.  22. “vidi eos oculis meis corporalibus aeque bene sicut ego video vos” (54).  23. “Vos de hoc habetis responsum quod habebitis ex me, nec habebitis aliud. Et vobis de hoc respondi ad certius quod ego sciam” (144–145).  24. “Interrogata an post diem martis novissimam ipsa locuta est cum sanctis Katharina et Margareta: respondit quod sic; sed nescit horam.  
Interrogata quo die: respondit quod heri et hodie; nec est dies quin eas audiat.  Interrogata si videt eas semper in eodem habitu: respondit quod videt semper eas in eadem  forma;  et  figurae  earum sunt  coronatae multum opulenter. De  aliis  habitibus non loquitur. Item dicit quod de tunicis earum nihil scit.  Interrogata qualiter scit quod res sibi apparens est vir vel mulier: respondit quod bene scit et cognoscit eas ad voces ipsarum, et quod sibi revelaverunt; nec scit aliquid quin sit factum per revelationem et praeceptum Dei.  Interrogata qualem figuram ibi videt: respondit quod videt faciem.  Interrogata  an  illae  Sanctae  apparentes  habent  capillos:  respondit:  “Bonum  est  ad sciendum!”  Interrogata  an  aliquid  erat medium  inter  coronas  earum et  capillos:  respondit  quod non.  Interrogata si capilli earum erant longi et pendentes: respondit: “Ego nihil scio.” Dicit etiam quod nescit  an  ibi  aliquid  erat  de  brachiis,  vel  an  erant  alia membra  figurata. Item dicit quod loquebantur optime et pulchre, et eas optime intelligebat.  Interrogata  qualiter  loquebantur,  cum  non  haberent  membra:  respondit:  “Ego  me refero  ad  Deum.”  Item  dicit  quod  vox  illa  est  pulchra,  dulcis  et  humilis,  et  loquitur idioma Gallicum” (64). See also Champion 1976, 66–67, 69–70; Barrett 1931, 81, 83–84.  25. Examples of others are in Champion 1976, 140–145; Barrett 1931, 123–126.  26.  “imo  nec  eas  sufficienter  declarare  verbo  vel  signo;  sed  hoc  facere  distulit, contradixit et recusavit, differt, contradicit et recusat” (204).  27. Compare Champion 63; Barrett 78 with Champion 70, 326–327; and Barrett 834, 279.  28.  “quod  legerentur  consequenter  interrogatoria  et  responsiones,  et  ea  quae legerentur, si non contradiceret, tenebat pro veris et confessatis” (157).  29.  “Johanna  confessa  fuit  quod  bene  credebat  se  dixisse  prout  scriptum  erat  in registro et prout eidem lectum fuit; nec ad aliqua de dictis contentis in dicto registro contradixit” (157).  30. “Protestificatio ueracium uisionum a Deo fluentium” (Scivias, 1:1.3).  31.  “De  hoc  mysterio  non  poteris  quidquam  amplius  uidere  nisi  ut  tibi  propter miraculum credendi conceditur” (Scivias, 1:2.1, lines 75–76). 
 32. “Cumque illuc aspicerem audiui uocem de caelo magno terrore me redarguentem et dicentem: ‘Quod uides diuinum est”‘ (Scivias, 2:3.4, lines 92–93).  33. “Hec que uides uera sunt; et ut ea uides ita sunt” (Scivias, 1.77, lines 1342–1343).  34. See Gregory the Great’s discussion on the “‘the voice above the firmament’” as “‘the voice of God’” (McGinn 1994, 57) and thus as the highest form of voice experience.  35.  “Ego uis diuinitatis ante euum et ante  tempora sum, nec  inceptionem temporum habeo.  Vis  enim  diuinitatis  sum,  qua Deus  omnia  discernendo  et  probando  fecit  .  .  . Deinde flammanter ueni, ac in utero Virginis eo accenso requieui, et de carne ipsius . . . incarnatus  sum”  (Scivias,  6.32,  lines  702–704,  714–716).  Weeks  points  out  that “German mysticism remains Christocentric” (1993, 10).  36. See Johnson: “Hildegard thus underlines her authority as both author and seer, an authority manifested through Volmar, who does not attempt to  impose his will upon her words .  .  . Both the miniature [showing Hildegard passing along the words of the Living  Light  to  Volmar]  and  Hildegard’s  account  of  Volmar  seem  to  hint  that  an author’s authority is in some measure enhanced by the presence of a scribe .  .  . Since St.  Augustine,  St.  Gregory,  and  St.  Bernard  had  composed  ‘through’  a  secretary, Hildegard explicitly claimed her right to compose and asserted her status as an author. This authority she traces directly to divine  inspiration, which allowed an  ‘unlearned’ woman  to  understand  exegetical  and  theological  matters  for  which  she  was  not trained. Hildegard’s special understanding is then further verified by the scribe, who transcribes  in a more permanent  form  the wax  tablets he  receives  from  the author” (1991, 823–824).  37. See Newman 1990, 47, 53 n. 87.  38. “Scio enim in textu interiorem intelligentiam expositionis Psalterii et Euangelii et aliorum uoluminum, que monstrantur mihi de hac uisione, que tangit pectus meum et animam  sicut  flamma  comburens,  docens me  hec  profunda  expositionis.  Sed  tamen non docet me litteras in Teutonica lingua, quas nescio, sed tantum scio in simplicitate legere, non in abscisione textus. Et de hoc responde mihi, quid tibi inde uideatur, quia homo sum indocta de ulla magistratione cum exteriori materia, sed intus in anima mea sum docta” (Epist. I, lines 17–25: see the translator’s note on the problems here, p. 29).  39.  “O mitis  pater,  ego  paupercula  forma  scripsi  tibi  hec  in  uera  uisione  in mystico spiramine, sicut Deus uoluit me docere” (Epist. II, lines 1–2, 7).  40.  “Vnde  nunc  mitto  tibi  litteras  istas  in  uera  admonitione  Dei.  Et  anima  mea desiderat,  ut  lumen de  lumine  in  te  luceat,  et  puros  oculos  tibi  infundat  et  spiritum tuum exsuscitet ad opus scripture istius, quatenus anima tua inde coronetur, quod Deo placet;  quia  multi  prudentes  de  terrenis  uisceribus  spargunt  hec  in  mutationem 
mentium  suarum  propter  pauperem  formam,  que  edificata  est  in  costa  et  que  est indocta de philosophis” (Epist. II, lines 8–15, 7–8).  41.  “Caue  ne  spernas  hec  mystica  Dei,  quia  sunt  necessaria  in  illa  necessitate,  que absconsa latet et que nondum aperte apparet” (Epist. II, lines 26–28).  42. For an analysis of Hildegard’s letter‐writing ethos, see Ahlgren 1993.  43. Article I of the twelve‐article accusation is especially full of misrepresentations of Joan’s testimony, her accusers’ own exercise in rewriting the text.  44. “Ipsa rursum respondit quod de patre et matre, et his quae fecerat, postquam iter arripuerat  in Franciam,  libenter  juraret;  sed, de  revelationibus eidem  factis  ex parte Dei, nunquam alicui dixerat seu revelaverat, nisi soli Karolo quem dicit regem suum; nec etiam revelaret si deberet eidem caput amputari” (29–30).  45.  “Interrogata an de  istis visionibus, quas dicit  se habere,  feceritne verbum curato suo  vel  alteri  homini  ecclessiastico:  respondit  quod  non,  sed  soli  Roberto  de Baudricuria et suo regi” (100).  46. See also McGinn 1994, 155.  47. The examination by the clergy at Poitiers on the nature of  Joan’s voices does not seem  to have been  thorough,  and  its  conclusions on  those voices were  certainly not binding on Joan. Scott claims that only two hours were spent on her voices — out of three weeks of examination (1974, 42). The conclusion of her examination at Poitiers —  “one  can  find  no  evil  in  her,  but  only  goodness,  humility,  virginity,  devoutness, honesty,  and  simplicity”  (“mais  en  elle  on  ne  trouve  point  de  mal,  fors  que  bien, humilité,  virginité,  dévocion,  honnesteté,  simplesse”)  (Pernoud  1955,  95;  Quicherat 1965, 3:392) — gives an implicit approval to her voices, but not an explicit one. As for Joan’s opinion of the proceedings, she did not seem to think that there was anything in the records from her examination at Poitiers to condemn her (56–57, 66–67, 263; 71, 81,  215),  but  she was  still  not willing  “to  refer  herself  and  submit  to  the  Church  of Poitiers”  (“se referre vel  submittere ecclesiae Pictavensi”)  (324; 278). The ease with which she passed any test concerning her revelations is reflected in the testimony of the only member of the Poitiers committee to survive to the time of the Nullification trial, Séguin de Séguin, who provides no details about her voice (the term is singular in his testimony) except to claim that it spoke better French than did Séguin, who spoke with a Limousin accent (Pernoud 1955, 101). Sabine Tanz speculates that because of the precarious situation of the French troops, the examiners at Poitiers were biased in favor  of  Joan  and  subjected  her  to  an  unusually  benevolent  interrogation  for  an Inquisition (1991, 245). Given the popularity of the “Merlin prophecies” (Wood 1988, 138,  141)  and  the  acknowledged  desperate willingness  of  the  French,  including  the clergy  who  were  on  their  side,  to  believe  anyone  who  promised  victory  (see  the testimony of Séguin de Séguin and Jean Barbin in Pernoud 1955, 102), perhaps it is not 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